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Leading Article
THE IMPACT OF THE VICINAGE REQUIREMENT:
AN EMPIRICAL LOOK
Dale W. Broeder*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the late Dean Ames and many of his contemporaries
would have blanched at what follows. Naturally it is here hoped
otherwise. Indeed, just cataloging the legal research undertakings
of such men would be supererogatory and presumptuous. Still,
research-wise, legal professional orientations have unmistakably
lately undergone marked change. It is no longer professionally
adequate to teach chiefly out of the law library. For good or ill,
(teachers spending the bulk of their time acting like Diogenes is
no unmixed blessing), legal academicians largely now study what
happens and then teach or preach in field research terms.
Of course, what appears here does not compare with the ex-
haustive empirical works recently published or currently in prog-
ress under the aegis of such foundations as The American Bar1 or
Vera2. This is rather an introductory sampling article drawn
from data generated by what is now familiarly known as the
University of Chicago Jury Project.3 The Jury Project, of course,
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo. The writer is deeply indebted
to Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. of the University of Chicago Law School
for seeing many points which would not otherwise herein appear.
Unfortunately, the name of the judge who made this undertaking pos-
sible cannot be revealed. Suffice it to say that he is a man deeply
concerned about the administration of justice and one of the finest
judges currently sitting on a federal bench.
1 See, e.g., Hazard, The Research Program of the American Bar Associa-
tion, 51 A.B.A.J. 539 (1965); LA FAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE
A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1964). See also SHERRY, THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF CnvnxAL JUSTICE IN T3E UNITED STATES (1955).
2 See, e.g., NATL. CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CR1IINAL JUSTICE INTERIM
REP. (1965); BAL 3N THE UNITED STATES: 1964 (1964). See also POVERTY
AND THE ADMNSTRATION OF FEDERAL CRvMNAL JUSTICE (1963); and the
various authorities cited in LOCKAT, KAmsAR & CHOPER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CRImNAL PihocFnumE 96 (1964); and PAULSEN & KADISH,
CRInIAL LAw AND ITS PROCESSES, 931-33 and 1044-47 (1962).
8 See generally Broeder, Plaintiff's Family Status as Affecting Juror Be-
havior: Some Tentative Insights, 14 J. PUB. L. 131 (1965); Broeder,
Voir Dire Examination: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 503
(1965); Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 Duke L.J. 19; Broeder,
Previous Jury Trial Service Affecting Juror Behavior, 506 Ins. L.J. 138
(1965) (reprinted by Matthew Bender in 1965 PERSONAL INJURY JouR-
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was made possible by a generous Ford Foundation grant to the
University of Chicago Law School.4 The author was associated
with the Project from 1953-1956.
Undertaken during this period was a study of twenty-three
consecutively tried jury trials in a federal district court in the
Midwest. The author personally observed all of such trials from
beginning to end. All but a few lawyers serving in them were
intensively interviewed, and with the court's permission, 225 ju-
rors participating in such cases were interviewed. The ordinary
juror interview ran two and one-half hours.
Obviously, valid statistical generalizations cannot be drawn
from an undertaking so limited. At the same time, experimental
data concerning jurors, however accurate and insightful, possess
an indefinable sterile strain. Accordingly, while the cases in ques-
tion are few and all different, hopefully what follows in some
small way supplements the large body of largely experimental
Jury Project data shortly scheduled for publication. 5
Insofar as the data presented herein are concerned, there were
NAL); Broeder, University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv.
744 (1959); Broeder, The Jury Project, 26 S.D.B.J. 133 (1957); and
Broeder, Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHL L. REv.
386 (1954). See also Broeder, Jury, 13 ENCYCLoPFiA BRITANNICA 205
(1963 ed.).
According to the 1950 census, the approximate population of the
three cities in which court was held was 120,000.
4 For Jury Project data generally, see Kalven, A Report on the Jury
Project of the University of Chicago Law School, 24 Ins. Counsel J.
368 (1957). See also Meltzer, A Projected Study of the Jury as a
Working Institution, 387 ANNALS 97 (1953).
For other Jury Project publications, see ZEIsEL, KALVEN AND Bucm-
HOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURTS (1959); Kalven, A General Analysis of and
Introduction to the Problem of Court Congestion and Delay, ABA SECT.
INs. N. & C. L. 322 (1963); Kalven, Zeisel and Buchholz, Delay in the
Court, 15 REcoRD of N.Y.C.B.A. 104 (1960); Kalven, Zeisel and Buch-
holz, Delay in the Court, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 23 (1959); Kalven, The Jury,
the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Omio ST. L.J. 158
(1958), reprinted in 7 U. CH. L. REV. 6 (1958); Zeisel & Callahan,
Split Trials and Timesaving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1606 (1963); Zeisel, Splitting Liability and Damage Issue Saves 20 Per
Cent of the Court's Time, ABA SECT. INS. N. & C. L. 328 (1963); Zeisel,
Kalven & Buchholz, Is the Trial Bar a Cause of Delay? 43 J. Am. JuD.
Soc'y. 17 (1959).
5 Jury Project books on criminal justice and on the impact of the Dur-
ham Rule are scheduled for almost immediate publication. See Durham
v. United States, 237 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Durham v. United
States, supra of course, holds that the criminal insanity test is 'mental
disease or defect." See generally, De Grazia, The Distinction of Being
Mad, 22 U. CHi. L. REV. 339 (1955).
THE IMPACT OF THE VICINAGE REQUIREMENT 101
sixteen civil cases and seven criminal cases. For obvious reasons,
all names and places herein mentioned have been changed.
II. THE DATA
Specifically, the purpose here is to describe the use made byjurors of the assorted store of information one acquires about his
neighborhood by living there--local community customs, problems
and affairs, local geography-and of the jurors' contacts with other
community members, many of whom get involved in jury trials as
parties, lawyers, witnesses, or jurors. How important was the
vicinage requirement in the cases studied?6 The discussion has
five parts, each dealing with a separate aspect of the question,
viz., juror out-of-court knowledge of or acquaintance with (1) local
conditions, (community problems, locations, directions, etc.); (2)
the parties; (3) the witnesses; (4) the lawyers; and (5) the other
jurors. An effort is made throughout to indicate the extent to
which such matters were elicited on voir dire.
A. JUROR KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL CoimTIONs
Juror knowledge of. local conditions played a part in the
decisions reached in ten of the fourteen civil cases in which the
subject was investigated and in three of the seven criminal cases
studied.7 The subject was not investigated either in White, a per-
sonal injury case settled just after the judge instructed the jury,
in Phillips # 18, another personal injury case where the jurors were
not interviewed until two and one-half years after the trial, nor
in another personal injury case otherwise exhaustively studied.
Turner and Thomas are the only personal injury cases in which
such knowledge, though made the subject of inquiry, did not seem
to play a part, a circumstance -which in Turner is most probably
6 The importance of the vicinage requirement, along, of course, with
other matters, was recently highlighted by Swain v. Alabama, 85 Sup.
Ct. 824 (1965). See also United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964);
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958). See generally, Paulsen
and Kadish, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1101 et. seq. As the aforemen-
tioned authorities deal principally with the contempt power and jury
trials, the classic study on the meaning and impact of venue and vici-
nage problems, together with their interrelationship, remains, Blume,
Jury Selection Analyzed: Proposed Revision of Federal System, 42
MIcH. L. REv. 831 (1944). Also see authorities cited therein.
7 The facts of the various cases are not herein set forth except insofar
as they are necessary to. explain a particular point.
8 This was a personal injury and property damage action resulting from
a two truck collision. The case was tried twice, the first highly un-
justified verdict having been upset by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
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explained by the fact that the accident giving rise to the litigation
occurred thousands of miles from the vicinage. Of the four crim-
inal cases in which such knowledge was apparently of no im-
portance, three-Williams,9 Goodman 0 and Brown"-were cases
where proof of defendant's guilt was overwhelming and where the
deliberations lasted approximately one-half hour. Meyer,12 how-
ever, as will later be shown,'3 was different.
(1) Personal Injury Cases
The relative impact and importance of "vicinage type"
knowledge materially varied from case to case. In the two Ford14
cases, for example, the only such knowledge of importance was
that several jurors were familiar with the road upon which the
accident occurred, realized that it was "unusually narrow" and
accordingly concluded that defendant's employee was driving too
fast. Similarly, familiarity with the intersection constituting the
scene of the accident in Sutter was a factor causing at least nine
of the eleven jurors personally interviewed to conclude that de-
fendant was not negligent. Particularly was this true of two
jurors who knew of numerous other accidents at such intersection,
caused, they had "heard," by persons, (such as plaintiff), driving
onto the preferential highway without properly gauging the speed
of oncoming vehicles, (such as defendant's vehicle). Mention was
made of this in the juryroom, although with what effect is un-
known. However, no such evidence was adduced at the trial.
A more striking illustration of the use made by jurors of their
familiarity with the scene of the accident is afforded by Phil-
lips # 2.15 Stillman, the strongest pro-defendant juror, claimed
to have driven over the scene "hundred of times" and was the
only juror allegedly familiar with the scene. This accordingly
provided Stillman with the foundation for the best of his several
9 This was a Mann Act case. Defendant was charged with transporting
his wife across a state line in order to place her in a house of ill-fame.
10 This was a Dyer Act prosecution.
11 This was likewise a Dyer Act prosecution.
12 Meyer was also prosecuted under the Dyer Act.
13 See text at pp. 106-07 infra.
14 Ford was a personal injury case involving two trucks. The first trial
resulted in a hung jury, the second in a substantial plaintiff's verdict.
Plaintiff's major claim was for property damage losses.
15 Phillips, like Ford, was tried twice. Defendant's judgment in the first
trial was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Retrial resulted
in a substantial plaintiff's verdict. The litigation is exhaustively re-
viewed in a forthcoming article in the Natural Resources Journal.
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tenuous jury room arguments that defendant was not liable, namely,
that the center-lane of the three-lane highway in question was
raised two inches and that this explained why defendant's em-
ployee failed to turn into such lane after observing a possible
obstruction in the lane in which he was traveling, an argument
which struck two jurors as possessing "considerable force." Still-
man claimed that his knowledge of the scene was one of the most
important factors militating against liability. Here, as in Sutter, 6
no evidence was introduced bearing upon the truth of the proferred
information, and the question was at no time referred to by
counsel.
However, the examples thus far considered, though important
for individual jurors, seem to have had little, if any, impact upon
the verdict. Living in the vicinage was, however, vitally important
in Grey, Drake17 and Field, all personal injury actions.
Plaintiff in Grey was an assembler for Electronics, Inc. where
Juror Forest was employed as an engineer. Another juror, Burns,
a grocer, worked as an Electronics, Inc. laborer for several years
during World War II. Both men were accordingly incensed at
defendant's lawyer for having persuaded an Electronics, Inc. plant
physician to produce certain X-ray pictures of plaintiff's chest
taken by such doctor prior to the accident. This action, they felt,
was a gross breach of propriety. As Juror Burns put it: "I
wouldn't want that physician testifying against me if I was in-
volved in a lawsuit. Those examinations are supposed to be con-
fidential." Both men admitted that their feelings in this regard
caused them to increase damages. Defendant's federal personal
injury pre-discovery rights, it appears, are not in practice always
an unmixed blessing.
Several Drake jurors were employed by large local industrial
concerns and accordingly "knew" that it was "standard practice"
for company representatives to contact injured workmen who,
after being ordered to return to work by a local company physician,
failed to do so. Such jurors therefore concluded that defendant's
"main negligence" consisted in failing to contact plaintiff under
such circumstances. Damages were therefore increased to punish
defendant and to preserve local industrial "standards of care" con-
cerning injured workmen.
Knowledge of local conditions was important in various ways
in Field. Thus one juror, Foreman Grimsby, a steel fabricator and
employer of several truck drivers, was aware of the local truck-
16 See text at 102 supra.
17 See text immediately following.
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driver wage-scale, knowledge which he used in calculating plain-
tiff's damages, plaintiff's intestate having been employed as a truck
driver in the locality. No evidence was adduced on the subject
during the trial. Grimsby explained his damage formula to fellow
jurors but with what effect is unknown. Grimsby also employed
his knowledge of prevailing local wages for unskilled labor, this
being a "relevant" consideration in figuring the amount of damages
to a Field property-damage plaintiff, one of the elements of such
plaintiff's damages-as Grimsby erroneously understood the in-
structions-being the value of plaintiff's labor in repairing his
damaged vehicle. Such knowledge, communicated to his fellows
during the deliberations, undoubtedly raised damages. No evidence
was introduced on this subject either and, even if proferred, would
not, under applicable local law, have been admissible.
Smyth, another Field juror, (a farmer favoring extremely
low damages), differed with Grimsby concerning the local truck-
driver wage-scale. While saying nothing on the subject during the
deliberations, he thought that "they [truckdrivers] around where
they [i.e., deceased and plaintiff-wife] live don't get no $1.70 an
hour like Mr. Grimsby said," and accordingly discounted Grimsby's
statement and reduced the amount of damages he personally was
willing to award. Smyth was also aware of the cost of raising
children on a farm, had in fact raised a child on a farm only a few
miles from the farm upon which plaintiff's children would be
raised, and knew and argued that such costs ("no more than $10.00
a week per child") were low vis-a-vis city child-raising costs.
This argument undoubtedly reduced damages. Smyth's informa-
tion was also not in evidence.
Knowledge of local conditions in Peters and Rose (personal
injury cases) was much more important than any evidence
introduced during the trial of such cases. In Peters, most jurors
were aware of the location of Richfield City (consisting largely
of bars and burlesque places) both with reference to Pershing
City from which plaintiff was returning at the time of the accident
and Lewisville, where the accident occurred. Nothing was said
about Richfield City during the trial. But, as Juror Blair phrased
the notion: "He [plaintiff] was proceeding from the west towards
the east, whereas if he had really been coming from Pershing City
he would have been coming .. . [the other way] .... I don't
know whether he stopped in Richmond or not, but I do know that
it took him an hour and forty-five minutes to come seven miles."
Several jurors, however, were not as judicious and actually
concluded that plaintiff stopped for drinks in Richmond.
Second, Mrs. Snell, another Peters juror, was personally ac-
quainted with: (1) a young Polish girl (not a witness) whose
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marriage plaintiff had been celebrating for the twelve hours just
prior to the accident and (2) with the amount of liquor which had
been ordered for the celebration, "gallons and gallons." Mrs.
Snell's knowledge in this regard caused her to view with complete
disbelief plaintiff's testimony that he had only drunk "a couple of
beers" at the celebration and was extremely important in causing
her to vote against liability. However, Mrs. Snell did not impart
her knowledge to her fellow jurors during the deliberations ("that
would have been improper"), although she did inform one juror
privately, Mrs. Stoner, a close personal friend with whom she
traveled to and from court during the trial. Mrs. Stoner, who
sustained a nervous breakdown in part on account of her jury
service, refused to be interviewed.
Again, most of the Peters' jurors were familiar with the street
in Lewisville upon which the accident occurred. This was im-
portant for it was plaintiff's contention that he was injured in an
"unmarked crosswalk" the existence of which, under the court's
instructions, depended upon the existence of an "intersection."
The existence of an "intersection," in turn, depended upon whether
a certain lane provided for traffic at the place where plaintiff
attempted to cross the street "conflicted with" or "merged into"
another lane provided for certain other traffic. If plaintiff was
found to be within an unmarked crosswalk, defendant had a
higher degree of care. Several jurors used their personal knowl-
edge to conclude that no "intersection" and hence "no unmarked
crosswalk" existed. However, certain others, also familiar with
the scene, felt that plaintiff was within an "unmarked crosswalk"
because they knew that pedestrians frequently cross the street
where plaintiff said he crossed. "There is a bus stop there and
the people getting off always cross there." This, while legally
irrelevant, was highly influential. A related point is that Juror
Weed purposefully refrained from driving over the scene because
several of his fellow jurors in a railroad accident case tried a week
before had criticized him for visiting the railroad crossing con-
stituting the scene of the accident in that case. The railroad
crossing in question, incidentally, was approximately twenty miles
from Weed's home. He visited it on the evening of the first day of
trial, and, after doing so, concluded that defendant railroad was not
liable. As this case ended with a directed verdict for defendant,
the jurors were not personally interviewed.
Several Rose jurors were familiar with the highway at the
scene of the accident, a twenty-five miles per hour speed zone on
U.S. Highway # 13, in Prescott, State X, and, furthermore "knew,"
as one of the jurors phrased it, "that those trucks barrel through
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Prescott every Sunday morning." The startling consequence was
these jurors' conclusion that plaintiff should not prevail because
he, as a long-time Prescott resident, was contributorily negligent
in walking onto the highway knowing the speed at which truck
drivers proceed through the town on Sundays. Such notion was
repeatedly stated during the deliberations. The uncontradicted
evidence showed that defendant's employee was traveling forty
miles per hour.
(2) Criminal Cases
Though knowledge of local conditions was a factor in propor-
tionately more of the civil than of the criminal cases studied, there
is no doubt that such knowledge, when a factor in the criminal
cases, was more important.' s One criminal-case defendant was
convicted and one ultimately acquitted in part on account of such
knowledge, while a third, who was acquitted, narrowly missed hav-
ing to undergo another trial.
The first of the three cases was Meyer, a Harrison Act case.
Several of the jurors, residents of the city where defendant al-
legedly possessed and sold narcotics, were familiar with the loca-
tion of the tavern at which such alleged sale and possession oc-
curred and accordingly "knew" that defendant lied when testify-
ing that he did not know of the tavern. This was because de-
fendant gave as his address a house and street number these jurors
knew was located only two blocks from the tavern. Two Meyer
jurors realized this on the first day of the trial, but, in order to
make sure, checked the tavern's location against defendant's ad-
dress that evening on their way home and subsequently imparted
such information to their fellow jurors during the deliberations.
This was the primary reason for defendant's conviction. Without
it, most jurors opined, an acquittal or a hung jury would probably
have resulted.
Of less importance to Meyer's conviction, although still a fac-
tor, was the realization of all Meyer jurors that dope peddling was
one of the community's most pressing problems. Indeed, the
husband of one juror, Mrs. Temple, was a vigorous member of a
18 The United States Supreme Court may decide this year whether an
unauthorized view of the scene of a crime by the jurors deprives a
criminal defendant of a fair trial. The state court held that although
such a view was improper it was not "such an impropriety as to require
the granting of a new trial .... " People v. Delucia, 15 N.Y.2d 294,
206 N.E.2d 324, 258 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1965) appeal pending 34 L.W. 3016
n.195 (1965). The effect on the vicinage requirement of a decision
invalidating the view is a matter of prophecy.
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local crime commission whose principal activity at the time of
trial was an anti-dope campaign. The teenager son of another
juror, Stillman, was offered a marijuana cigarette approximately
one week prior to trial, a circumstance, it seems clear, causing
Stillman to vote for acquittal on the first ballot in order to show
his "impartiality." Neither the Temple or Stillman experience was
elicited on voir dire, although Stillman stated during his interview
that he should "perhaps have spoken up and disqualified myself,
I felt so strongly about the incident." Stillman's silence was
probably due to his love of jury service on criminal cases and to
the status such service gave him among his fellow employees at
"the plant."
The second case is Ward, a prosecution of an ex-East Parma
police officer for stealing a box of trousers from a post office.
One of the jurors, Mrs. Edmonds, a resident of East Parma,
"knew" that the East Parma police force was "rotten from the top
right down to the bottom" and that "you can't believe anything
good that is said about them, because it isn't true and you should
believe everything bad, because it's probably true, and then some."
She "knew" this both from personal experience in dealing with
the East Parma police (she once bribed them to release her hus-
band from a serious criminal charge and had frequently bribed
them on behalf of her "Equality Party" precinct constituents) and
from "just living here and talking to people." This was important
because defendant's main defense was that the Government's star
witnesses, all East Parma police officers, were "out to get him"
because he had opposed their illegal mechanations before being
discharged from "the force." Mrs. Edmonds' poor opinion of "the
force" was her main reason for wanting to acquit. She, along
with two of her colleagues, hanged the jury. Defendant was ac-
quitted on retrial.
Mrs. Edmonds freely expressed her opinion of "the force"
during the deliberations (without, however, referring to its basis),
but her argument had no effect upon pro-conviction jurors. Her
"knowledge," of course, was not elicited on voir dire. Interestingly,
the United States Attorney in Lewisville, where Ward was tried,
had for several years followed the policy of peremptorily challeng-
ing all East Parma veniremen. Though this policy was not fol-
lowed in Ward, since Ward and because Government counsel
interviewed one of the Ward jurors, it is again in force.
As it turned out, Mann Act defendant Cooper got an acquittal.
But just barely. Two jurors, Mrs. Logan and Mrs. Cornel, were
active anti-vice campaigners, staunch conservatives, and fully
aware of the political and social conditions giving rise to the prose-
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cution, namely, that the liberals in control of St. Francis County,
where defendant was tried, consistently refused to arrest prosti-
tutes. They knew, also, that the instant prosecution was initiated
by the United States Attorney on the petition of several residents
of St. Francis County and that defendant's conviction was neces-
sary if such county's disorderly houses were to be closed. This was
an important consideration inducing both women originally to vote
for conviction and for Mrs. Logan to hold out for five hours.
However, so far as two other Cooper jurors were concerned,
living in the vicinage was in part responsible for defendant's ac-
quittal. Jurors Bean and Frank were Roman Catholics and knew
both the location and familiar name of St. Francis County's
largest Roman Catholic church, "The Sanctuary" (where defend-
ant claimed he was reforming), and accordingly supposed that
Government counsel was likewise aware of this. These men were
incensed with Government counsel (and with the Government's
case against defendant), when counsel ridiculed defendant's in-
ability to give the Church's formal name and its address. For they
did not know specifically of such matters either and felt that
counsel's statements were intended as "slurring references" to the
Roman Catholic Church.
B. JUROR CONTACTS WITH PARTIES
Such contacts existed and affected the thinking and behavior
of one or more jurors in three cases, Thomas, Grey, and Field, all
personal injury actions. In none of these cases were such contacts
elicited on voir dire although in one instance the nature of the
contact was squarely covered by voir dire questioning. This was
Thomas where one juror, Powers, had once been involved in a
railroad-crossing accident with one of defendant's freight trains.
Though, in Power's opinion, the accident was solely due to his own
negligence, the railroad had "generously" reimbursed him for all
of his out-of-pocket expenses. "They treated me fairly, too fairly,
from the point of view of the railroad's stockholders." Accord-
ingly, Powers "knew" that defendant would not welch on any
"honest or even half-way honest" obligation and that plaintiff's
claim must have been, as contended by defense counsel, com-
pletely fraudulent. There seems little doubt, notwithstanding
Power's denial, that his prior relationship with defendant was one
of the factors causing him originally to vote against liability.
Especially is this true in view of his silence when the venire was
asked whether anyone had ever had any dealings with either of
the litigants and whether anyone had been involved in a "serious"
accident.
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Juror Sumners in Grey, a personal injury case, was well ac-
quainted with plaintiff's mother, father, and brother and had even
attended high school with plaintiff though he had never actually
met her. Sumners was an executive at the bank at which the
plaintiff's family did business. Furthermore, he knew of the "un-
fortunate circumstances" surrounding plaintiff's marriage to a
Congressman's son (only "the bare fact that plaintiff was divorced
was in evidence) and that she had been badly treated and was
forced to endure numerous personal indignities. While Sumners
denied that such knowledge had any effect upon his thinking, the
fact that an obviously conservative bank executive should prove
to be plaintiff's most forceful juryroom champion and favor
higher damages than any other juror save one is unusual. The
point is strengthened by the circumstance that Sumners remained
silent when the venire were asked whether anyone was ac-
quainted with plaintiff.
In addition to Sumners, Mrs. Woods, another Grey juror, while
personally unacquainted with plaintiff or any of her friends or
relatives, did know of her "unfortunate marriage" and discussed
it with Sumners during trial. However, the effect of her knowl-
edge in this regard is not known.
Smyth, a FieZd juror, while personally unacquainted with the
property-damage plaintiff in such case,19 was aware of such plain-
tiff's "outstanding .reputation as an honest businessman" and,
accordingly, placed great importance upon his testimony. Both
men were engaged in different aspects of the grain business.
Smyth failed to disclose his indirect contact with plaintiff on
voir dire.
C. JUROR CONTACTS wrm WITNESSES
Such out-of-court contacts are known to have existed and to
have played a part in the thinking of one or more jurors in four of
the eleven civil cases in which such contacts were investigated.
None of the criminal case jurors was acquainted with any wit-
nesses. In none of the civil cases were such contacts elicited on
voir dire.
The contact's effect was minimal in but one case, Sutter.
Here, Juror Ives was personally acquainted with one of defend-
19 There were many plaintiffs in Field. Basically, however, the case was
a wrongful death action for the benefit of the surviving widow and two
baby girls. A complete account of the Field trial is shortly scheduled
for publication by Little-Brown and Co.
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ant's witnesses and with his family. According to Ives, "None of
them is very reliable. I wouldn't base anything on what any of
them said unless there was some other basis for doing so." Ac-
cordingly, Ives was led to "throw out" the witness' testimony,
which went to the heart of defendant's defense, namely, that
plaintiff drove into a preferential highway without stopping for
the stop sign on an intersecting nonpreferential highway. How-
ever, Ives concluded that defendant was not liable on other
grounds.
The situation differed in the remaining three cases. Thus in
Drake, an FELA case, Juror Harper's chance acquaintance with
two defense medical experts probably raised the level of plaintiff's
award by several thousand dollars. This was because Harper had
contacted both just prior to trial in order to remedy a severe back
pain and had been told that the cause of his pain, "like the cause
of most back pains," could not objectively be determined. In view
of the doctors' statements to him, Harper viewed with complete
disbelief their positive witness-stand assertions that plaintiff's back
pains, if he had any, were solely attributable to an osteo-arthritic
condition. It was generally agreed among the jurors that Harper's
statements during deliberations caused a substantial increase in
damages.
Juror acquaintance with medical witnesses likewise played an
important part in Phillips # 2.20 The effect of Juror Ring's ac-
quaintance with one of plaintiff's doctors and with defendant's
doctors in such case is elsewhere reported.21 Suffice it to say here
that such contacts, by an odd combination of circumstances, were
a major cause of plaintiff's high verdict. Aside from Mrs. Ring, the
only other juror in any way acquainted with a witness was Still-
man, who, like Mrs. Ring, strongly favored defendant's doctors,
knew of them "by reputation" and had "heard nothing but good
about them." Whether this had any effect upon Stillman's think-
ing is doubtful. However, his strong views regarding plaintiff's
injuries paralleled those of the defendant's doctors. And Still-
man referred to the "excellent reputations" of defendant's doctors
during the deliberations as a reason why his colleagues should ig-
nore the conflicting testimony of plaintiff's principal medical wit-
ness.
Peters, another personal injury case, provides one final exam-
ple. Foreman Preston was acquainted with defendant's star eye-
20 See note 15 supra.
21 See Broeder, Voir Dire Examination: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL.
L. REV. 503 (1965).
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witness, Officer O'Day, who, in substance, blamed the accident on
plaintiff's contributory negligence. O'Day's parents ran a grocery
store where Preston's parents shopped when he was a child. Even
then, thirty-five years before, O'Day was "on the force" and Pres-
ton knew that he was "honest". O'Day's testimony coupled with
his failure to arrest defendant at the scene of the accident was
conclusive for Preston. He described such testimony and such
failure to arrest as the most influential factors inducing him to
vote for defendant. Significantly also, Preston stated that the
heated and angry cross-examination of O'Day by plaintiff's coun-
sel was the "thing . . . [he] liked least about the trial." While
Preston communicated his knowledge that O'Day was "honest" to
his fellow jurors during the deliberations, the effect of this is
unknown.
D. JUROR CONTACTS wrT= ATToRNEYs
One or more jurors was acquainted with a lawyer in eight of
the twelve civil cases in which the subject was investigated. In
criminal cases such contacts were proportionately less numerous;
they existed in but two of the seven cases studied. For the most
part, juror-lawyer contacts were elicited on voir dire although
several striking examples of conscious concealment also appear.
Rose, a personal injury action, was the only case in which a
juror-lawyer acquaintance seems to have had absolutely no effect,
such contact having been established on voir dire.
The situation in Sutter, another personal injury case, was as
follows: One juror, Evans, was acquainted with counsel for both
sides, such fact having been elicited on voir dire. Another juror,
Moore, was acquainted with plaintiff's counsel. This fact was also
elicited by counsel. A third juror, Mrs. Learner, was defense coun-
sel's neighbor who, though present at the table, did not actively
participate in the trial. Mrs. Learner did not reveal this fact,
though clearly required to by voir dire questioning. Evans, it
developed, had no use for plaintiff's counsel, had for years re-
garded him as a "windbag" while he had always admired defense
counsel. Evans was strongly for defendant. Juror Moore, on the
other hand, who liked plaintiff's counsel, bent backwards to see
that Evans' client did not prevail and was defendant's most forcible
juryroom advocate.
Grey presents two clear-cut examples of conscious conceal-
ment. One juror, Mrs. Woods, private secretary to the president of
a large local bank, had occasionally been present in her em-
ployer's office in connection with matters with which her employer
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and defense counsel were concerned, and, as a result, had an
extremely high regard for such attorney's ability. While the effect
of this upon her thinking is unknown, her-silence when asked
whether anyone was acquainted, with defendant's attorney coupled
with her low damage position vis-a-vis. the other jurors is inter-
esting, to say the least.
The second example is afforded by the voir dire silence of
Foreman Ball in Grey. While freely, admitting an acquaintance
with counsel for both sides during his personal interview, he said
nothing when questioned about the subject on voir dire. Plaintiff's
counsel, it should be noted, resided in Ball's small town. Defense
counsel lived and worked in a fairly distant metropolis. Ball fa-
vored extremely large damages vis-a-vis the other jurors.
Juror Smyth, in Field,2 2 was acquainted with one of de-
fendant's attorneys, "know him to speak to," as he phrased it on
voir dire. The consequence appears to have been twofold. First,
Smyth was more influenced by his lawyer friend's arguments than
by those of any other lawyer. And, second, "friendly" defense
counsel spent fifteen minutes of his closing argument talking
about "not talking as a lawyer, but as a friend and neighbor," an
"argument," Smyth said, which was "very well taken." Smyth
favored lower damages than any other juror and almost hung the
jury.
Foreman Preston in Peters23 was acquainted with counsel for
both sides, a fact established on voir dire. The voir dire picture,
however, was inaccurate, for it conveyed the impression that Pres-
ton knew one as well as the other. Actually, Preston barely knew
plaintiff's counsel while he and defense counsel had once occu-
pied apartments in the same building for several years during the
depression, were good friends, had often entertained one another
and had even been friendly opponents for a local ping-pong
championship, the outcome of which Preston still remembered, in-
cluding the score of each game. Preston was defendant's most
vigorous juryroom champion.
Admittedly, the effects of most of the above-considered juror-
lawyer contacts are problematical. The imprint of such contacts
in the three remaining civil cases, however, is unmistakable.
Thus, Mrs. Tims, a Turner juror,24 was defense attorney's
Godmother and a close personal friend both of the attorney and
22 See note 18 supra.
23 See text at pp. 104-05 supra.
24 See text at pp. 101-02 supra.
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family. All attended the same church for years, though Mrs.
Tims, a religious person, attended more regularly. None of this
was elicited on voir dire. The consequence of the relationship was
two-fold. First, defense counsel spent three-fourths of his closing
argument time quoting from the Bible and talking about the
"Golden Rule" (an appeal to his Godmother's religiosity) which
was said to have special applicability in cases where a passenger-
guest sues his motorist-driver friend (as Mrs. Tims put it, "turns
coat on his friend"). And, second, that such argument (and such
relationship with defense counsel) had a decisive impact upon
Mrs. Tims' thinking. She was strongly, even violently, pro-de-
fendant.
Mrs. Carter, an apparently honest and intelligent Phillips
# 1 juror, alleged by sworn affidavit filed in connection with
plaintiff's motion for a new trial, that an alternate juror, one
Polsky informed the jurors during the trial of various nefarious
activities and litigation with which plaintiff's counsel had once
been concerned, that Polsky was prejudiced against plaintiff's
counsel both because he was a Jew and for other reasons unknown
to Mrs. Carter and that he inflamed the jurors against plaintiff
and his lawyer by charging that plaintiff's lawsuit was an insidious
conspiracy to defraud. Although Polsky was unfortunately never
interviewed, interviews with other Phillips # 1 jurors provide
strong evidence both that he made the statements attributed to
him by Mrs. Carter and that such statements influenced the ver-
dict. In this connection, it should be noted that the repeated
objections of plaintiff's counsel designed to keep plaintiff's insur-
ance protection from being disclosed gave Polsky's statements a
greater potentiality for harm than they would probably otherwise
have possessed.
The third and last civil case is Phillips # 2. As established on
voir dire, Juror Stillman was acquainted with lawyer Paxton,
counsel for one defendant, and with Casper, counsel for another.
The three were fellow Masons. Stillman's relationship with Pax-
ton apparently had no effect. However, the impact of the Stillman-
Casper acquaintance, though indirect, is well established. For it
set the stage for the charge, advanced by Juror Cody, that Still-
man was siding with defendant solely because of his friendship
with Casper. A major juryroom argument resulted which almost
came to blows but which seems also to have prompted Stillman
to change his vote. All but one juror (in addition to Stillman)
stated that the incident was the major unanimity-producing factor.
Cooper and Ward were the only criminal cases involving juror-
lawyer contacts. Several Cooper jurors knew of defendant's
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counsel by reputation, counsel having been the Democratic candi-
date for United States Senator in the election just preceding the
trial. However, such knowledge, with one possible exception, ap-
parently had no effect. The possible exception is Mrs. Cornel.
During trial, she inquired of numerous friends whether defense
counsel was an "ordinary criminal lawyer" or a "respectable
lawyer" who just happened to be taking a criminal case. The
inquiries established defense counsel's "respectability," a factor, it
seems, in causing Mrs. Cornel ultimately to abandon her position
that defendant was guilty.
From the point of view of juror-lawyer relationships affecting
the verdict, Ward is undoubtedly the most enlightening of the
cases. Voir dire developed only that Juror Tyler was "acquainted"
with Government counsel and that Juror Edmonds knew defense
counsel "to speak to" but that both could act impartially. Neither
juror appears to have been able to do so. In fact, Tyler was a
close friend and bowling companion of Government counsel, not
just an "acquaintance." Strongly pro-acquittal in the juryroom
(he along with Mrs. Edmonds and another hung the jury), several
Ward jurors opined that Tyler's position was in part attributable to
his friendship with Government counsel, i.e., he attempted to be
"too fair" to defendant.
The effect of Mrs. Edmond's "knew him to speak to" relation-
ship with defense counsel was just the opposite. The whole truth
was that Mrs. Edmonds was a long-time admirer of defense coun-
sel, had worked with him in politics, and had been in his home in
connection with "Equality Party" affairs. A Negro, Mrs. Edmonds
also admired him for remaining in East Parma when Negroes be-
gan moving there in large numbers. She also admired him as a
lawyer, stating in the juryroom that he would never represent a
guilty client. "Springer is honest." Doubtless, her feeling to-
wards defense counsel was one of her major reasons for hanging
the jury. Retrial resulted in an acquittal.
E. JUROR CONTACTS WITH OTHER JURORS
One or more jurors were previously acquainted in nine of the
twelve civil cases in which such matters were investigated and in
three of the seven criminal cases studied. With the exception of
one criminal case, the relationships in question unfailingly left
their mark. In none of the cases was the existence of any such
relationship elicited on voir dire.
In three of the cases, however, Turner, Drake, and Brown,
(all personal injury actions), the only apparent effect of such
previous contacts was to influence the election of particular per-
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sons as foreman.25 Such contacts also influenced the election of
the foreman in three other cases, but had other effects also, as
discussed below.
So far as the civil cases are concerned, the situation, other
than as affecting the election of particular persons as foremen,
was as follows. In Ford # 1, Miss Statler, a clerical worker at
ABC Steel, had formerly worked under the direct supervision of
Juror King, an ABC engineering executive, and had an ex-
tremely high regard for his intelligence. This, she said, caused
her to abandon her initial juryroom position that defendant was
not liable.
Jurors Stillman, Robbins, Land, and McGee (Ford # 2) were
good friends and fellow political workers, formed a tight but un-
successful coalition to raise damages and attempted, more suc-
cessfully, to dominate the deliberations, thus angering other jurors
and making for a very inharmonious discussion. Jurors Sealy
and Ives were closely acquainted in Sutter. The latter (by extra-
jury room discussion) was instrumental in causing Sealy to change
his vote.
The situation in Grey was more complicated. Three inter-
relationships were involved. Most important was the long-time
feud between two jurors, Mrs. Knight and Mrs. Woods. The pair
quarreled bitterly throughout the trial and, in the deliberations,
made "impolite" remarks about one another which raised a signifi-
cant note of tension overcome only through the charm of the jury
foreman. Mrs. Knight and Juror Vernon, another Grey juror, were
also previously acquainted, a fact which seems, for a variety of
reasons, to have prompted the former to raise her personal damage
estimate. Juror Simms appears to have had the same effect upon
Juror Price. The former was Juror Price's banker and had his
respect and admiration, along with an overdue mortgage.
The effect of the Juror Sweet-Leslie relationship in Field is
also noteworthy. Mrs. Sweet, an Electronics, Inc. tabulator opera-
tor, once worked under Leslie's direct supervision; Leslie was Elec-
tronics, Inc.'s Superintendent of Customer Engineering. Simi-
larly, in Phillip's # 2, Juror Scott, a prominent businessman, was
a long-time, although casual acquaintance of Juror Bonham, having
often borrowed money from the bank of which Mrs. Bonham was
vice-president. While Scott was obviously not influenced by Mrs.
Bonham, the latter admitted that she was "considerably influ-
enced" by Scott's argument that "if we had to make a mistake it
25 A forthcoming essay on this subject is shortly scheduled for publication.
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was better to err on the side of awarding too much rather than
too small an amount." Mrs. Bonham also commented that she
and her husband had "always thought very highly of Mr. Scott,
both as a businessman and as a public-spirited citizen," and that,
as "Mr. Scott was no radical, but a conservative business man and
thought that ... [plaintiff] was entitled to all that money, perhaps
there was, after all, something to be said for that point of view."
Thomas (another personal injury case) is more complicated.
First, Juror Block was previously acquainted both with Juror
Rex, whom she detested, and with Juror Lawton, whom she liked.
Rex, in turn, to the extent that he had ever thought about Mrs.
Block, returned the compliment. The pair became involved in a
heated deliberation's argument which in no small degree con-
tributed to its disharmony. The effect of the Block-Lawton rela-
tionship, as described by the former, was as follows:
I walked beside him [Lawton] the night the jury went out, [i.e.,
to deliberate]. He had been kind of siding with the buzzards,
Powers and Rex. I made a point of walking close to John [Law-
ton]. They had been saying the railroad was not responsible.
I told him, 'John, you know it was a railroad accident as plain as
the nose on your face!' But he was over with the big shots trying
to be hard like they were. But I knew he wasn't that way. He
is a working-man and he has had a lot of sickness.
More important from the point of view of affecting the ver-
dict in Thomas, however, was the pre-trial friendship between
Mrs. Brill, the strongest pro-defendant juror, and Mrs. Trainer,
the most intelligent and articulate of the jurors favoring plaintiff.
Both were executive officers in the state's American Legion
Auxiliary. This friendship was an important factor prompting
Mrs. Brill ultimately to change her vote. In addition, Mrs. Brill
was a distant cousin of Foreman Benton, knew of his "desire to
avoid a hung jury" and opined that he was principally responsible
for avoiding a hung jury.
The situations in Phillips # 1, Peters, and Rose (all personal
injury cases) were unique. Several of the women jurors in
Phillips # 1 were well-acquainted, having worked closely together
at church and PTA functions. Though the data are inadequate,
such pre-trial relationships were apparently potent factors in
prompting a highly unjustified verdict for defendant. 26
Mrs. Snell was the common inter-juror denominator in Peters.
A close personal friend of Juror Stoner-both were high ranking
local conservatives-the two were inseparable during the trial,
26 See text immediately following.
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traveled to and from court in the same car and thoroughly dis-
cussed the case during such trips. The consequence was that
Mrs. Stoner, a nervous, sensitive person, did just what Mrs.
Snell told her, Mrs. Snell having special juror expertise by way of
previous jury service in the local circuit court. Mrs. Snell was, in
addition, distantly related to Juror Sherman, who, like Mrs.
Stoner, was also extremely nervous and shy. Mrs. Snell was
Sherman's liaison to the other jurors during the deliberations.
Saying nothing to the jurors as a whole, Sherman would privately
address occasional questions to Mrs. Snell who, in turn, would
propound them to the jurors as a body.27
The relationship in Rose (a wrongful death action) was be-
tween Jurors Cox and Mrs. Edmonds, both of whom were Negro
residents of East Parma. Well-acquainted prior to trial-both were
active participants in East Parma civic affairs, particularly poli-
tics-they ate lunch together during the trial and, in general, kept
close company throughout. They did not, however, get along, the
major trouble stemming from Mrs. Edmond's outspoken civil rights
attitude as contrasted with Cox's policy of "gradualism." Things
came to a head during one of the noon recesses when Mrs. Ed-
monds wanted Cox to join her in crashing one of Lewisville's
"all-white" restaurants, Cox refusing. The pair engaged in a
heated personal battle during the deliberations. Mrs. Edmonds at
one point charged Cox with perjury for failing to make a voir
dire disclosure of the fact that he was once an insurance broker.
The few inter-juror relationships present in the criminal cases
were, so far as could be determined, insignificant other than in
connection with the election of particular persons as foremen.28
III. CONCLUSION
If the foregoing data are any criteria, the importance of living
in the vicinage seems obvious. It shaped the course of adjudication
in some way in almost every case studied. Most memorably for
the author, it sent a man to jail in Meyer,29 set another free in
27 Two other Peters jurors, Mrs. Glen and Mrs. Pratt, were also previously
acquainted. Indeed, they were practically next-door-neighbors. Fur-
thermore, Mrs. Pratt gave piano lessons to Mrs. Glen's daughter. How-
ever, this relationship apparently had no effect.
28 Considerable data were collected on the factors responsible for the
election of particular jurors as foremen. Such data are elsewhere
presented.
29 See text at pp. 106-07 supra.
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Ward,30 helped avoid a hung jury in Phillips # 231 and materially
increased the size of plaintiff's award in Drake.32
Another point is the degree to which the lawyers in the cases
studied, at least when judged by their performances on voir dire,
failed to anticipate the effects of knowledge derived from the
vicinage. In some instances, of course, they did anticipate and ask
questions. Several examples of conscious concealment appear.
More often, however, and particularly with reference to whether
the jurors were previously acquainted, such matters were ignored.
In view of the materials and with reference to the permitted scope
of lawyer participation on voir dire in the court where the data
were collected, such conduct appears unjustified. The more phil-
isophical (but admittedly more meaningful) reflections on the im-
portance of having our jurors live in the neighborhood are best
here left alone.
30 See text at p. 107 supra.
31 See text at pp. 102-03 and p. 110 supra.
32 See text at p. 103 supra.
